











































Abstract. Generous income support programs as provided by European
welfare states have often been blamed to reduce work incentives for lower
income classes and to increase durations of unemployment. Standard studies
measure work incentives based on annual income concepts. This paper ana-
lyzes how work incentives inherent in the German tax-benefit system evolve
when extending the time horizon to three years (long-term). Participation
tax rates are computed for 3-year periods 1995-1997 and 2005-2007 to reveal
potential effects of the labor market reforms between 2003 and 2005. Results
show that long-term work incentives increased even more than short-term
work incentives. Particularly for middle-income individuals, this is largely
explained by the abolition of earnings-related unemployment assistance.
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1 Introduction
The shaping of income tax tariffs and income support programmes generates substantial
controversy among policy-makers and economists (Brewer et al., 2008). Optimal tax
theory argues that a tax-benefit system should be fair and minimize distortions (Mir-
rlees, 1971). A tax-benefit system can promote equality by transferring income from
the rich to the poor. But this may come at the cost of efficiency. Transfers to the poor
may induce low income individuals not to work at all and progressive taxes may cause
middle and high income individuals to work less.
The efficiency cost of a tax-benefit system depends amongst others on the behavioral
response of individuals to taxes and benefits and on the post-tax financial reward when
changing individual labor supply (Immervoll et al., 2007). The behavioral response cap-
tures to what extent decisions at the extensive and intensive margin are influenced by
the tax-benefit system.1 The financial reward of an increase in individual labor supply
is determined by the design of a tax-benefit system due to the tax levied on additional
earnings and the withdrawal of benefits. Two measures characterize the work incentives
inherent in a tax-benefit system: the participation tax rate (PTR) measures the post-tax
financial gain from working compared to not working; the effective marginal tax rate
(EMTR) captures the post-tax financial gain from working a bit more. The empirical
literature has shown that behavioral responses at the extensive margin are more impor-
tant, particularly for low-income individuals.2
The last two decades have seen a lively discussion regarding the readjustment of Eu-
ropean welfare states. Under the general impression that efficiency costs of tax-benefit
systems are high especially at the extensive margin, major labor market reforms in many
European countries have been undertaken in the 1990s and early 2000s. Reforms were
mostly aimed at the reduction of out-of-work benefits and characterized by a transition
to more activating labor market schemes to increase incentives to take up work. In Ger-
many, a coalition of social democrats and green party came into power in 1998 after 16
years of conservative government. The most radical changes, the so-called Hartz-reforms,
were introduced between 2003 and 2005. Moreover, personal income tax reforms between
1998 and 2005 substantially reduced average tax rates especially relieving the rich (Cor-
neo, 2005).
The aim of this paper is to compare work incentives measured by PTRs before and
after the reforms of the red-green government in Germany. The study first extends the
1Saez (2002) first incorporates intensive and extensive margins into optimal tax theory.
2See Meghir and Phillips (2010) for an overview over empirical studies on labor supply elasticities.
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analysis of work incentives to more than a year.3 PTRs are computed for 1-year and
3-year periods encompassing the years 1995-1997 and 2005-2007. The previous literature
measures work incentives based on annual income concepts. Thereby, important aspects
are neglected which individuals maximizing utility over time might consider. A work-
ing individual can experience earnings growth over time driven by training on the job
and tenure. In contrast, a non-working individual receives benefits from unemployment
insurance and social assistance that are determined by institutional rules. Long-term
unemployment4 leads to a depreciation of the individual’s human capital which in turn
decreases the probability of reintegration in the labor market and reduces future earn-
ings potential. Most importantly, out-of-work benefits in Germany are decreasing with
the duration of unemployment. Earnings-related unemployment benefits are only paid
for about a year for most age groups. Thus, financial consequences of long-term unem-
ployment as opposed to working are captured more comprehensively when extending the
horizon to more than a year. Out-of-work income after the exhaustion of unemployment
benefits is cut back even more since the reform in 2005 replaced earnings-related un-
employment assistance, which was paid after the exhaustion of unemployment benefits,
by means-tested social assistance. Thus, the reform potentially increased the post-tax
financial reward for taking up a job for certain income groups.
PTRs are computed for the entire earnings distribution and demographic subgroups.
Decomposing the results reveals if work incentives were enhanced for specially targeted
subgroups like singles. Joint taxation of married couples, as is the case in Germany, can
result in very low work incentives for the partner with the inferior earnings potential,
which still applies more often to the female partner (Immervoll et al., 2007). Thus,
PTRs are differentiated by gender and household type characteristics.
Basic concepts regarding the measurement of a long-term PTR are outlined in section 2
and the underlying data base is described in section 3. Section 4 explains the simulation
for which section 5 explains the institutional rules effective in the respective period.
Results are discussed in section 6 and section 7 concludes.
3For cross-country studies on PTRs in EU countries see Immervoll et al. (2007), Immervoll et al.
(2009) and O’Donoghue (2011). These studies rely on the simulation model EUROMOD based on
the tax-benefit rules prevailing in the year 1998. Country studies on PTRs are, e.g., Dockery et al.
(2008) for Australia, Adam et al. (2006) and Brewer et al. (2008) for UK as well as Pirttilä and
Selin (2011) for Sweden.
4According to German §18 Social Code III, individuals are classified as long-term unemployed if
unemployed for more than a year.
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2 Basic Concepts
2.1 Measuring participation tax rates
The PTR captures the implicit tax on working imposed by the tax-benefit system.5 It
is assumed that the individual 𝑖 can choose between the two labor market states 𝐸 em-
ployed or 𝑈 unemployed. The PTR measures the change in household net taxes from
labor market state 𝐸 to 𝑈 as a fraction of individual earnings in labor market state 𝐸.
Taxes and benefits are based on the household context for three reasons. First, the loss
of earned income may not only trigger off eligibility rights for the unemployed individual
but for other household members as well. Second, joint taxation in Germany requires to
consider a married couple as a unit and to assess taxes on the basis of household income.
Third, the impact of a change in overall household income on taxes and benefits takes the
extent of income brought in by other household members and by other income sources
into account. Net taxes 𝑇ℎ paid by the household ℎ are income taxes 𝑡ℎ including social
security contributions reduced by transfers 𝑏ℎ. Individuals in high-income households
will pay positive net taxes to the government as taxes will exceed benefits. Individuals
in low-income households will receive benefits from the government paying negative net
taxes. According to Immervoll et al. (2007) an annual PTR can thus be denoted as
𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ,𝑡 =
𝑇 (𝑦𝐸ℎ,𝑡)− 𝑇 (𝑦𝑈ℎ,𝑡)
𝑦𝐸,𝑤𝑖,𝑡
, (1)
where 𝑦𝐸ℎ is gross household income and 𝑇 (𝑦
𝐸
ℎ ) is household net taxes when the indi-
vidual is employed and thus in labor market state 𝐸 suppressing time indices. 𝑦𝑈ℎ is
gross household income if setting individual earnings to zero and holding constant other
household members’ labor income and household income from other sources. 𝑇 (𝑦𝑈ℎ ) is
household net taxes in case the individual is unemployed and in labor market state 𝑈 .
If household net taxes are equal for both labor market states, then the PTR is zero
and incentives to take up work are not distorted. But a welfare state providing income
support in state 𝑈 usually leads to 𝑡ℎ < 𝑏ℎ resulting in 𝑇 (𝑦
𝑈
ℎ ) < 0 as unemployment
benefits will be higher than taxes paid for the declined household income 𝑦𝑈ℎ . In sum,
5The replacement rate of household income gives the share of in-work income that is maintained
when one household member stops working. Replacement rates may be high in case of generous
income support by welfare states or because of household income from other sources. But including
these other income sources clouds the effects of the tax-benefit system. The PTR concentrates on
the change of net taxes when out of work as a fraction of earnings. Thereby, it provides a better
measure for the resulting work incentives of the tax-benefit system per se because it isolates to what
degree the tax-benefit system replaces lost earnings (O’Donoghue, 2011).
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the change in net taxes will be positive in presence of a welfare state and the PTR will
be higher than zero for most individuals. The higher the PTR, the more do generous
income support programs reduce the financial gain from working. The PTR is one, if
the change in net taxes 𝑇 (𝑦𝐸ℎ )− 𝑇 (𝑦𝑈ℎ ) (numerator) is equal to individual earnings 𝑦𝐸,𝑤𝑖
(denominator). In this case, there is no financial gain from working. If out-of-work
income support exceeds earnings, then the PTR can be even greater than 1.
2.2 Long-term participation tax rates
The standard approach assesses work incentives over the time horizon of one year. But
economic theory on household economics predicts income pooling and budget smoothing
over long periods. Individuals may thus condition their participation decision not only
on the expected income of the next year, but rather on a longer time horizon. A work-
ing individual can achieve potential earnings increases over time carving out a career
as opposed to a transfer dependent individual receiving a stable transfer income fixed
by the legislator. But earnings-related unemployment benefits are only paid during a
limited period of time, i.e., during one year for most individuals in Germany. Extending
the time horizon of the PTR, the drop of benefits after exhaustion of earnings-related
unemployment benefits can be accounted for. Hence, PTRs are calculated for one year
and for a longer time period of three years to shed light on labor market participation
incentives in the long-term. To calculate long-term PTRs a long-term income measure
is needed.
Long-term income is computed as the Net Present Value (NPV) of income streams over
the respective period. The NPV indicates what future income streams accumulated over









Income 𝑦𝑘 in year 𝑘 of the 3-year period is discounted with discount factor 𝑑𝑘 based on
interest rate 𝑖𝑘−1 of a zero-coupon bond with 𝑘 − 1 years to maturity. Interest rates
are taken from the yield curve which takes market participants’ expectations today on
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future interest rates and inflation into account.6 Yield curve interest rates for the base
years 1995 and 2005 with one or two years to maturity are given in Table 1.




Source: Own calculations based on interest rates of listed German Federal Treasury bonds available at
www.bundesbank.de.
Note: 𝑖1𝑡 refers to interest rate of a zero-coupon bond in base year 𝑡 with 𝑘 − 1 = 1 year to maturity.
Since the NPV is sensitive to the discount rate, deflated long-term incomes using the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) are computed alternatively. However, results do not differ
much.7
Using (1) and (2) and suppressing time index 𝑡 yields a measure for PTR in the long-
term as
𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔ℎ =





𝑘=1 𝑑𝑘 · [𝑇 (𝑦𝐸ℎ,𝑘)− (𝑇 (𝑦𝑈ℎ,𝑘))]∑︀𝐾=3
𝑘=1 𝑑𝑘 · 𝑦𝐸,𝑤𝑖,𝑘
PTRs are computed over two 3-year periods 1995-1997 and 2005-2007. Thereby, results
can be produced for a time horizon before and after the major labor market reforms
between 2003 and 2005. Additionally, the interim period from 1999 to 2003 when earn-
ings from side job in marginal employment (geringfügige Beschäftigung) were subject to
taxes and social security contributions changing work incentives for marginal employ-
ment temporarily is spared from the analysis. To explore PTRs of the entire work force
rather than being restricted to look at those individuals whose change of employment
status is observed in the data, the working population in state 𝐸 is considered (Immer-
voll/O’Donoghue, 2004). For this population, household income, taxes and transfers are
then simulated for state 𝑈 . This is illustrated in Figure 1.
6Yield curve interest rates are computed on the basis of German Federal Treasury Bonds. See Bartels
(2012) for a detailed description of the yield curve as an indicator for expected interest rates.
7Results based on CPI-adjusted long-term income measures are available from the author upon request.
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The analysis is based on a subsample from the SOEP survey years 1993 to 2008. The
SOEP is a representative panel study containing individual and household data in Ger-
many from 1984 onwards and was expanded to the New German Laender after German
reunification in 1990. All household members are interviewed individually once they
reach the age of 16. A critical variable in the calculation of taxable income, taxes and
benefits is the year in which reported income is received. Yearly income in the SOEP is
asked retrospectively, e.g., the income reported in 1996 belongs to 1995.8
For each 3-year period a balanced panel is constructed. The sample only includes indi-
viduals who were employed during all three years and are aged between 20 and 49 in the
first year to avoid distortions due to early or partial retirement which is possible after
the age of 55. Those individuals are dropped who exhibit a missing on labor income not
replaced by an imputed value and who are self-employed or civil servants in the last two
years before the 3-year period and, as a consequence, did not necessarily contribute to
unemployment insurance. Disabled individuals and recipients of unemployment benefits,
subsistence allowance9 or social assistance are excluded, too. Only individuals belonging
to households classifiable as single, single parent, married couple without children and
married couple with one or two children are included. Since PTRs presumably turn out
quite different for certain demographic groups, the panel is divided into subgroups such
as gender and household type differentiated by the number of household members and
8See Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005), Frick (2006) and Wagner et al. (2007) for further details.
9Subsistence allowance is paid in place of unemployment benefits if the unemployed undertakes voca-
tional training. It is merged to unemployment benefits in 2005.
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the number of earners. Table 2 presents the number of observations for each subgroup.
Case numbers are too small for single parents to produce reliable results, so they are
dropped from the sample. If both adults are working and meet the requirements outlined
above, then the household enters the sample twice.
Table 2: Number of observations
Period 1995 2005
All 1324 1557
Gender Male 778 882
Female 546 675
Household type Single 177 332
Married couple 260 317
w/o children
Married couple 887 908
with 1 or 2 children
Source: SOEP
Employment decisions and earnings are largely correlated with gender. Women are
more probable to work less and earn less than their husband. Moreover, women are
more probable to live in a couple and to live in two-earner households. The distribution
of one- and two-earner households over singles, couples and families with children is
presented in Table 3. The share of single households increases between the two periods
for both men and women whereas the share of two-earner families decreases.
Table 3: Share of household types by gender
Household type 1995 2005
Men Women Men Women
Single, no children 13.1% 13.8% 23% 19.1%
Couple, no children
Spouse not working 2.1% 2.9% 2.7% 5.3%
Spouse working 13% 23.3% 13.7% 20.2%
Couple with children
Spouse not working 25.8% 8.4% 22.6% 8.4%
Spouse working 46% 51.6% 38% 47%




Informations on household income 𝑦𝐸ℎ and individual earnings 𝑦
𝐸,𝑤
𝑖 in labor market state
𝐸 are taken from the SOEP data which are outlined in detail in Table 4.
Table 4: Informations in the data for labor market state 𝐸
Gross household income (𝑦𝐸ℎ ) labor earnings, asset income, private transfers,
private pensions, social security pensions
Individual labor earnings (𝑦𝐸,𝑤𝑖 ) earnings from dependent employment
Source: SOEP
Gross household income 𝑦𝑈ℎ if the individual is out of work is simulated. It is obtained





ℎ − 𝑦𝐸,𝑤𝑖 (4)
Taxes 𝑡𝐸ℎ are simulated using the same simulation procedure as for taxes 𝑡
𝑈
ℎ to assure
consistent assumptions regarding deductions etc. Explanations focus on state 𝑈 in the
following, but the computation of household taxes in state 𝐸 is equivalent to state 𝑈 .
Household taxes paid in state 𝑈 are the sum of income tax 𝑇𝑈,𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ assessed on the basis of
𝑦𝑈ℎ , solidarity surcharge 𝑇
𝑈,𝑆
ℎ and social security contributions 𝑆
𝑈
𝑗 on spouse’s earnings
𝑦𝐸,𝑤𝑗 if the spouse 𝑗 is working in 𝐸. Household taxes 𝑡
𝑈














Household public transfers 𝑏𝐸ℎ in state 𝐸 are taken from the data and household pub-
lic transfers received in state 𝑈 are partly simulated as displayed in Table 5. Income-
related transfers such as unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance and housing
allowances need to be recomputed. In contrast, direct housing subsidy, maternity bene-
fits and child benefits do not depend on household income and can be taken from state
𝐸 in the data. Government student assistance and special circumstances support are
assumed to remain constant when changing to state 𝑈 .
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Table 5: Public transfers in labor market state 𝐸 and 𝑈
Public transfers (𝑏𝐸ℎ ) unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance,
maternity benefits, government student assistance,
social assistance, special circumstances support,
housing allowances, direct housing subsidy,
child benefits
Public transfers (𝑏𝑈ℎ ) unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance,
maternity benefits, government student assistance,
social assistance, special circumstances support,
housing allowances, direct housing subsidy,
child benefits
Source: SOEP
Note: Transfers in italics are simulated.
Formally, household public transfers in 𝑈 are given as
𝑏𝑈ℎ = 𝑏
𝐸
ℎ − (𝑏𝐸,𝑠𝑎ℎ + 𝑏𝐸,ℎ𝑎ℎ ) + (𝑏𝑈,𝑢𝑏𝑖 + 𝑏𝑈,𝑢𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑈,𝑠𝑎ℎ + 𝑏𝑈,ℎ𝑎ℎ ), (6)
where 𝑏𝑢𝑏ℎ is unemployment benefits and 𝑏
𝑢𝑎
ℎ is unemployment assistance both depending
on the presence of children 𝑐. 𝑏𝑠𝑎ℎ is social assistance and 𝑏
ℎ𝑎
ℎ is housing allowance.
5 Tax-Benefit System
5.1 Benefits
Statutory provisions for each of the potential transfer payments are described in the
following. In calculating transfer payments if the individual is in state 𝑈 , insurance pay-
ments, means-tested payments and not means-tested payments have to be distinguished.
5.1.1 Unemployment Benefits
As an insurance program, a potential receipt of unemployment benefits depends on in-
surance contributions carried out during employment. Contributions to unemployment
insurance and thus unemployment benefits are top-coded. Unemployment benefits 𝑏𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡(𝑐)
in year 𝑡 are obtained as a specific percentage of net earnings of the previous year 𝑡− 1.
Thus, the simulation of unemployment benefits 𝑏𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡(𝑐) hypothetically received if out of
work in 1995 and 2005 refers to earnings of 1994 and 2004, respectively. Formally un-
employment benefits are given by
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𝑏𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡(𝑐) = 𝑠
𝑢𝑏(𝑐) · (𝑦𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑡𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1), (7)
where 𝑠𝑢𝑏(𝑐) is the percentage of previous net earnings depending on the existence of
children 𝑐 ∈ {0, 1}. 𝑠𝑢𝑏(𝑐) lies at 60 % for childless individuals (𝑐 = 0) and at 67 %
for parents (𝑐 = 1). Net earnings of the previous year are given by gross earnings 𝑦𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1
reduced by wage taxes 𝑡𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 and social security contributions 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1.
The length of the entitlement is increasing with age and has been subject to several
reforms under the period of investigation.10 Table 6 provides details to changes in the
length of entitlement.
Table 6: Unemployment benefits - Length of entitlement in months
1995 1996 1997 2005 2006 2007
Age <43 12 12 12 12 12 12
43-45 18 18 12 12 12 12
46-49 22 22 18 18 12 12
50-54 26 26 22 22 12 12
Source: §127 Social Code III; Steffen (2008); BMAS (2012)
In 2006, the duration for which one can receive benefits declines remarkably for almost
all age groups. The sample includes individuals up to the age of 49 in the first year of
the 3-year period, for what reason entitlement lengths for older age groups are not listed
in Table 6. But generosity of a transfer system also entails the level of a benefit and
the conditions necessary to qualify for the benefit and those for continuing to receive a
benefit (Scruggs, 2006). The time period a person had to be employed subject to social
security contributions to be able to apply for unemployment benefits is a minimum
of 12 months. But during 1995 to 1997 these 12 months of employment has to take
place during the last three years, whereas the time horizon is shortened in 2006 to two
years according to §123 and §124 Social Code III. However, the level of the benefit as
percentage of previous net earnings remains untouched.
10The entitlement length depends also on the number of months employed subject to social security
contributions during the last seven years according to §127 social code III. For the simulation it is
assumed, that individuals were employed in total for at least 24 months during the last seven years
thus being eligible for 12 months unemployment benefits.
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5.1.2 Unemployment Assistance
For the years 1995 to 1997 individuals may receive earnings-related unemployment as-
sistance after the exhaustion of unemployment benefits. Unemployment assistance is
an insurance payment hinging on social security contributions, but means-tested at the
same time. Possible claims for unemployment assistance are reduced by net household
income. Net household income is reduced again by an allowance on spouse’s earnings
equal to his hypothetical unemployment assistance claim (§194 Social Code III). The
remaining amount decreases the claim of the individual for unemployment assistance
which can be expressed as
𝑏𝑢𝑎𝑖,𝑡 (𝑐) = 𝑠
𝑢𝑎(𝑐) · (𝑦𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑡𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) (8)
−((𝑦𝑈ℎ,𝑡−1 − 𝑡𝑈ℎ,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝑗,𝑡−1)− 𝑠𝑢𝑎(𝑐) · (𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝑡𝑤𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝑗,𝑡−1)),
where 𝑠𝑢𝑎(𝑐) is the percentage of previous net earnings depending on the existence of
children 𝑐 ∈ {0, 1}. 𝑠𝑢𝑎(𝑐) is at 53 % for childless individuals (𝑐 = 0) and at 57 % for
parents (𝑐 = 1). 𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡, 𝑡
𝑤
𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 are spouse’s earnings, wage taxes and social security
contributions. In sum, only single or individuals with a partner who is a transfer recipient
and/or not working receive the full amount of unemployment assistance. Families with
children receive a more generous income support. This is the case for both unemployment
benefits and unemployment assistance. Unemployment assistance is allowed for one
year after which the individual has to renew his claim and prove his neediness again
(§190 Social Code III). Under the condition that the claim is admitted unemployment
assistance can be granted until the individual’s retirement.
5.1.3 Social Assistance
Means-tested social assistance is based on the needs of the household as a whole with
household members being treated as a community (Bedarfsgemeinschaft). Households
can be entitled to social assistance if the individual in state 𝑈 has not contributed (suf-
ficiently) to unemployment insurance in state 𝐸 (1) or if the claim for unemployment
benefits/assistance of the individual in state 𝑈 is very low (2). In 2005, the so-called
Hartz IV-reform merges social assistance for those able to work and unemployment assis-
tance to a single system so called unemployment benefit II (Arbeitslosengeld II ). Since
payments of unemployment benefit II are equivalent to social assistance it is referred
to social assistance in the following. Starting in 2005, households additionally can be
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entitled to social assistance if unemployment benefits of the individual in state 𝑈 are
exhausted (3) with the overall household income not covering household needs.
The household head receives the standard rate of social assistance according to §20 of
Social Code II, whereas other household members only receive a share of the standard
rate depending on age. Hence, social assistance increases with the number of persons in
the household. Standard rates differ between Old and New German Laender for most
of the time under investigation and are presented in Table 7.
Table 7: Social assistance - monthly standard rates
1995 1996 1997 2005 2006 2007
West 267 270 273 345 345 347
East 258 261 264 331 331 347
Source: BMAS (2012)
Note: Standard rates are in current Euros.
Table 8 shows household member shares for the two 3-year periods. In 2005, shares
are raised for partners and children. Only for children between 14 and 17 years shares
are reduced.11




0-6 years 50% 0-5 years 60%
7-13 years 65% 6-13 years 70%
14-17 years 90% 14-17 years 80%
18+ years 80% 18+ years 80%
Source: §22 Federal Social Security Act, §20 Social Code II, governing law of the respective year.
Note: Standard rates are displayed in Table 6.
The sum of household member shares gives the householdsize-specific factor 𝑓ℎ,𝑡 which
is multiplied by the annual standard rate 𝑠𝑟ℎ,𝑡(𝑟). The standard rate 𝑠𝑟ℎ,𝑡(𝑟) differs by
region 𝑟 the household is located (West or East Germany) and year 𝑡 as shown in Ta-
ble 7. Additionally, housing assistance ℎℎℎ,𝑡(𝑟) is provided to compensate for rent and
heating payments. Possible claims on social assistance 𝑏𝑠𝑎ℎ,𝑡(𝑐) are computed as
11In the simulation fixed shares are used: 0.6 for children between 0 and 14 years and 0.8 for household
members older than 14 years.
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𝑏𝑠𝑎ℎ,𝑡(𝑐) = 𝑓ℎ,𝑡 · 𝑠𝑟ℎ,𝑡(𝑟) + ℎℎℎ,𝑡(𝑟) (9)
Household size-specific housing and heating transfers are taken from the statistical data
of the German labor administration (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) available for the years
2005 to 2007 and are provided in Table 9.12
Table 9: Housing assistance - monthly household size-specific average pay-
ments
2005 2006 2007
1 West 228.23 251.47 256.71
East 199.07 223.09 226.02
2 West 315.39 325.22 327.43
East 271.52 284.39 283.01
3 West 366.93 379.45 380.26
East 320.74 334.87 334.60
4 West 433.76 447.80 448.51
East 378.90 394.53 396.91
5+ West 521.40 541.33 545.66
East 471.18 496.74 499.54
Source: Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2005, 2006, 2007)
Note: Payments are in current Euro.
Potential claims for social assistance are reduced by household income and property
as well as unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance. For the simulation it
is assumed that household’s property does not exceed the exemption limits. Following
Bönke and Eichfelder (2010), claims for social assistance after deductions can be ex-
pressed as
𝑏𝑠𝑎ℎ,𝑡(𝑐) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑓ℎ,𝑡 · 𝑠𝑟ℎ,𝑡(𝑟) + ℎℎℎ,𝑡(𝑟)− 𝑐ℎℎ,𝑡(𝑐) (10)
−𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑦𝑈ℎ − 𝑡𝑈ℎ + 𝑏𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡(𝑐) + 𝑏𝑢𝑎𝑖,𝑡 (𝑐)−𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐿𝐸, 𝑦𝑈ℎ )− 𝐴𝑗, 0), 0),
where 𝑐ℎℎ,𝑡(𝑐) are child benefits and 𝐴𝑗 denotes the earnings allowance for spouse 𝑗’s
earnings 𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 according to §11b of Social Code II. 𝐿𝐸 is lump-sum income-related ex-
penses of 100 Euro per month or 1,200 per year in §11 Social Code II, which is granted
12Before 2005, average housing transfers are documented by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (Statistis-
ches Bundesamt), but heating transfers are neither included nor provided separately. To compute
housing and heating transfers of the years 1995 to 1997 transfers for 2005 as given in Table 9 are
deflated to price levels of the respective years.
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since 2005. Statutory earnings allowance are subject to reform between the two 3-year





𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 0.25 · 𝑠𝑟ℎ,𝑡(𝑟) (11a)
0.15 · 𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 if 0.25 · 𝑠𝑟ℎ,𝑡(𝑟) < 𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 0.5 · 𝑠𝑟ℎ,𝑡(𝑟) (11b)
Allowances since 2005 are defined as
𝐴𝑗,𝑡 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0.2 · (𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 − 1200) if 1200 < 𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 9, 600 (12a)
0.2 · 8, 400 + 0.1 · (𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 − 9, 600) if 9, 600 < 𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 14, 400 (12b)
0.2 · 8, 400 + 0.1 · 8400 if 𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 > 14, 400 (12c)
The upper limit of 14,400 Euro increases to 18,000 Euro if children live in the household.
5.1.4 Housing allowance
Households with an income below a specific threshold can apply for housing allowance in
place of social assistance. The payment depends on the number of household members
and on household income reduced by lump sum deductions. Housing allowances are
computed in accordance to the German Housing Benefit Act (Wohngeldgesetz ) following
Bönke and Eichfelder (2010) as
𝑏ℎ𝑎ℎ, =𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐻
ℎ𝑎
ℎ,𝑡 − (𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 ·𝐻ℎ𝑎ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 ·𝐻ℎ𝑎ℎ,𝑡) · 𝑦ℎ𝑎ℎ,𝑡, 0), (13)
where 𝐻ℎ𝑎ℎ denotes the relevant housing costs, 𝑦
ℎ𝑎
ℎ the relevant net household income and
𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖, 𝑐𝑖 the factors in appendix 1 of the Housing Benefit Act. The relevant income for
housing benefits 𝑦ℎ𝑎ℎ is gross household income 𝑦
𝑈
ℎ reduced by the lump sum for income-
related expenses 𝐿𝐸, which is described in detail in 5.2.2. The relevant housing costs
𝐻ℎ𝑎ℎ,𝑡 are calculated equivalently to housing assistance as included in social assistance.
5.1.5 Child benefits
Households with children receive child benefits depending on the number of children.
Child benefits are paid at least until the 18th birthday regardless of the labor market
state of the parents. A tax exemption instead of child benefits is granted to households
with higher income. Table 10 presents monthly child benefits and child allowances over
time.
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Table 10: Monthly child benefits and child allowances
1995 1996 1997 2005 2006 2007
1st child 36 102 112 154 154 154
2nd 66 102 112 154 154 154
3rd 112 153 153 154 154 154
4th + 123 179 179 179 179 179
Child
allowance 2,098 3,203 3,534 3,648 3,648 3,648
Source: §6 Federal Child Benefit Act, §32 and §66 Income Tax Code, governing law of the respective year
Note: Benefits and allowances are in current Euros.
In 2005 an additional child benefit (Kinderzuschlag) is introduced to raise the house-
hold income of working families above the threshold of social assistance (§6a Federal
Child Benefit Act). The additional child benefit is conditional on being employed and
is so far the only in-work benefit in Germany. Households are eligible for this benefit if
household income meets the needs of the parents but not the needs of their children. The
maximum benefit lies at 140 Euro per month for children under 18 years living in the
same household as their parents and is granted to households where household income
is equal to the hypothetical claim on social assistance of the parents only. If income lies
above that level, additional child benefit is withdrawn at a rate of 70 %. The upper
income level for eligibility lies at the social assistance level for the household as a whole
including the children.
5.2 Taxes
Statutory provisions for the calculation of household income taxes and social security
contributions are described below.
5.2.1 Social security contributions
Individual gross earnings is the assessment basis for social security contributions of
the employee. Earnings below a threshold are denoted as marginal employment and
exempted from social security contributions. The reform in 2005 increases the threshold
remarkably to 400 Euro per month (or 4,800 Euro annually). Year-specific earnings
thresholds are shown in Table 11.13
13Up to the earnings threshold the employer pays a flat-rate contribution which does not establish an
entitlement to social security payments such as unemployment benefits for the employee.
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Table 11: Annual earnings thresholds for marginal employment
1995 1996 1997 2005-07
West 3559 3620 3743 4800
East 2884 3068 3190 4800
Source: §8 Social Code IV; IAB (2012)
Note: Earnings thresholds are in current Euros.
From 1995 to 1997, earnings exceeding these thresholds are due to social security con-
tributions resulting in high marginal tax rates. With the introduction of a zone with
increasing social security contributions for modest incomes in 2005 marginal tax rates for
low income earners are cut down. Since then, social security contributions increase for
annual earnings between 𝑒1𝑡=4,800 and 𝑒
2
𝑡=9,600 Euro (so-called Midi-Jobs) from about
4% to about 21% according to §20 Social Code IV. The overall social security contribu-
tion rate does not change significantly over time. Hence, a contribution rate 𝑠 = 21% is
applied to calculate social security contributions 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 for earnings above earnings thresh-
old 𝑒1𝑡 = 𝑒
2
𝑡 between 1995 and 1997 and above 𝑒
2
𝑡 between 2005 and 2007, respectively.
Above the contribution ceiling 𝑅𝑉 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡 of the respective year 𝑡 contributions are fixed
in absolute value.14 Social security contributions are simulated for a working spouse 𝑗
when individual 𝑖 is out of work and in state 𝑈 . 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 are given as
𝑆𝑗,𝑡 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 𝑒1𝑡 > 𝑦
𝑤
𝑗,𝑡 (14a)
𝑠 · (𝐹 · 𝑒1𝑡 + (2− 𝐹 )(𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑒1𝑡 )) if 𝑒1𝑡 < 𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑒2𝑡 (14b)
𝑠 · 𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 if 𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 > 𝑒2𝑡 (14c)
𝑠 ·𝑅𝑉 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡 if 𝑦𝑤𝑗,𝑡 > 𝑅𝑉 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡 (14d)
𝐹 is a fixed factor equal to 0.7673.
5.2.2 Income tax
Gross household income is subject to taxes on income if exceeding the exemption limits.
Table 12 shows exemption limits and other central features of the German income tax
schedule over time. Income tax reforms undertaken by the red-green government between
1998 and 2005 reduces average tax rates substantially. The tax burden for low income
14For the simulation the contribution assessment ceiling of social security pensions and unemployment
insurance is applied.
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groups is reduced by decreasing the basic allowance and the minimal marginal tax rate.
In the German tax schedule, marginal tax rates increase linearly with income up to
a threshold indicated as the end of progression zone in Table 12. The top marginal
tax rates stays constant for income exceeding that threshold. Both threshold and top
marginal tax rate are decreased throughout the reforms reducing the tax burden of high
income groups, too. In 2007, an additional threshold for the rich is introduced above
which the marginal tax rate is 45%.
Table 12: Changes in the German income tax schedule
year Allowance Min. marginal End of pro- Top marginal
tax rate gression zone tax rate
1995 2,871 19.0% 61,376 53%
1996/1997 6,184 25.9% 61,376 53%
2005/2006 7,664 15.0% 52,152 42%
2007 7,664 15.0% 250,001 45%
Source: German Federal Ministry of Finance
Note: Values are in current Euros.
Calculating the taxable income, a lump sum for income-related expenses 𝐿𝐸 and a
lump sum for special private expenses (Sonderausgaben) 𝐿𝑆 is deducted. It is assumed
that expenses do not exceed these lump-sum deductions. Furthermore, the saver’s al-
lowance 𝑆𝐴 is deducted from asset income which is twice as high for married couples.
Lump sum deductions over time are presented in Table 13.
Table 13: Lump sum deductions
1995-97 2005-06 2007
LE 1023 920 920
LS 55 36 36
SA 3,068 1,370 750
Source: §9a, §10c and §20 Income Tax Code of the respective years.
Note: Deductions are in current Euros.
Moreover, social security contributions can be partially deducted from taxable income.
A time-varying amount 𝑆𝐸𝑚2𝑗,𝑡 reflecting social security contributions is deducted from
taxable income. Since 2005 tax authorities apply the more favorable of two different
calculations of deductions 𝑆𝐸𝑚1𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑆𝐸
𝑚2
𝑗,𝑡 (§10 Income Tax Code).
15 Furthermore,
15For details regarding the assessment of 𝑆𝐸𝑚1𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑆𝐸
𝑚2
𝑗,𝑡 see Bönke and Eichfelder (2008).
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the profit share (Ertragsanteil) of social security pensions is added to taxable income.16
According to the progression clause (Progressionsvorbehalt) of §32b Income Tax Code
unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance and maternity benefits have to be in-
cluded when computing the income tax rate, but are not considered when assessing the








𝑖,𝑡 (𝑐)+𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡(𝑐)−𝐿𝐸−𝐿𝑆−𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑆𝐸𝑚1𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑆𝐸𝑚2𝑗,𝑡 ), 𝑆𝑗,𝑡), (15)
The income tax 𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐 is then computed according to §32a Income Tax Code. The income





and is applied to the taxable income given as
𝑦𝑇ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑦
𝑈
ℎ,𝑡 − 𝐿𝐸 − 𝐿𝑆 −𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑆𝐸𝑚1𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑆𝐸𝑚2𝑗,𝑡 ), 𝑆𝑗,𝑡), (16)




ℎ,𝑡 · 𝑦𝑇ℎ,𝑡. Married couples are taxed
jointly. Couple’s joint taxable income is halved to assess the income tax rate. Then, the
resulting income tax is doubled.
5.2.3 Solidarity surcharge
A solidarity surcharge 𝑇 𝑆 is levied if the income tax surpasses the exemption limit 𝐸𝐿𝑆.
Table 14 shows rates of the solidarity surcharge 𝑡𝑠 and exemption limits 𝐸𝐿𝑆 over time.




Source: §3 and §4 Solidarity Surcharge Code
Note: Exemptions limits are in current Euros.
On the first pay level the surcharge is imposed at a higher marginal rate 𝑡𝑠* = 20%.
Hence, 𝑇 𝑆ℎ,𝑡 is given by
𝑇 𝑆ℎ,𝑡 =
{︃
0 if 𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ,𝑡 ≤ 𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑡 (17a)
𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ,𝑡 · (1 + 𝑡𝑠), 𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ,𝑡 + (𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ,𝑡 − 𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑡 ) · 𝑡𝑠*) if 𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ,𝑡 > 𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑡 (17b)
16Only the profit share of social security pensions is taxed, which varies over time. For the simulation,
the profit share is assumed to be stable at 30 %.
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6 Results
There are several factors that lead to variation of PTRs among the population. High out-
of-work income provided by the welfare state and large reductions in household net taxes
when changing to state 𝑈 generate high PTRs. It strongly depends on the household
context to which extent household net taxes are reduced in state 𝑈 and to which extent
hypothetical claims on means-tested benefits are withdrawn because of other household
income sources. Another major determinant is individual earnings in the denominator
of the PTR-formula. The lower wage and/or weekly working hours, the higher is the
PTR. So real wage growth may also lead to lower PTRs and higher work incentives.
6.1 Participation tax rates by individual earnings
PTRs of working individuals sorted by earnings deciles are displayed in Figure 2. The
line denoted by triangles gives the median PTR over a 3-year period (long-term), whereas
the line denoted by dots presents the median PTR over a 1-year period (short-term). For
PTRs over three years, earnings deciles are based on NPV of earnings over three years
and for annual PTRs on annual earnings. The graph on the left hand depicts PTRs for
the pre-reform period 1995-1997 and the graph on the right for the post-reform period
2005-2007.
The short-term PTR of the median earner (5th decile) earning about 24,000 Euro in
1995 is at about 80%. This implies that the difference between in- and out-of-work net
taxes is 19,200 Euro which equals 80% of individual gross earnings. For a single with
income from earnings only, this results from taxes on earnings of 11,000 Euros and zero
transfers when in state 𝐸 and zero taxes and unemployment benefits of 8,200 Euro when
in state 𝑈 . The PTR is attributable to the sum of the in-work tax rate 11,000
24,000
= 46%
and the out-of-work gross benefit ratio 8,200
24,000
= 34%.
In both periods, PTRs decrease when extending the measurement period to three years.
In the long-term, out-of-work income falls when unemployment benefits are exhausted.
In 1995-1997, short-term PTRs are about 10 percentage points higher than long-term
PTRs. Because of the abolition of unemployment assistance in 2005 income may drop
even further to levels of social assistance when unemployment benefits are exhausted.
Before the reform higher income earners receive 53% of net earnings when unemployed
for more than a year, whereas they fall back to social assistance if being the household’s
principal earner thereafter. Accordingly, the post-reform spread between short-term and
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long-term PTRs increases to almost 20 percentage points for most deciles. Long-term
PTRs of low income earners exceed short-term PTRs slightly. Explanations for this
occurrence are provided in the descriptions of Figure 3 and 4.
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Source: Own calculations
Notes: PTR are median PTR of the respective earnings decile. Earnings deciles are based on earnings over one year and
three years, respectively. Dotted lines denote Hall’s (1994) bootstrap confidence intervals at 95%-level.
A direct comparison of short-term PTRs for the years 1995 and 2005 is displayed in
Figure 3. Short-term PTRs before the reform are remarkably stable over earnings deciles.
Income tax reductions when changing to state 𝑈 and earnings-related unemployment
benefits increase almost with the same rate as earnings over the deciles such that the
PTR remains rather constant. Earnings of individuals in the 6th decile are about 27,000
Euro in 1995. For a single in the 6th decile, taxes on earnings are about 12,000 Euros
in state 𝐸 and unemployment benefits about 9,600 Euro when in state 𝑈 . Compared
to the median earner (5th decile) outlined above, the difference between net taxes in-
and out-of-work is 2,400 Euro higher whereas earnings increase by 3,000 Euro. This
means that each additional Euro earned increases the differences between net taxes in-
and out-of work by 0.8 Euro.
For most earnings deciles, post-reform PTRs decrease slightly. But PTRs decrease
sharply for individuals in the lowest earnings. In 1995, individuals in the lowest decile
earned a maximum of 12135 Euro (in prices of 2005), whereas in 2005 the decile threshold
lies at 7300 Euro. This earnings drop in the lowest decile reflects the growth of the low-
income sector which in turn implies a higher number of working individuals who are
not subject to social security contributions. Consequently, less individuals accumulate
claims for unemployment benefits. Indeed, the portion of individuals in the lowest
earnings decile eligible for unemployment benefits falls from 76% in 1995 to 28% in
2005. In both periods, more than 80% of the two lowest deciles are women. Particularly
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in the lowest decile, they are mainly side earners married to a spouse earning their
livelihood. Most of these individuals are not eligible for social assistance because of
spouse’s high earnings. Accordingly, the share of individuals in the lowest decile receiving
social assistance in 𝑈 stays rather constant at 10% in 1995 and 9% in 2005. Reduced
eligibility for unemployment benefits combined with limited claims for social assistance
in the lowest decile is responsible for low levels of post-reform PTRs. Furthermore, lower
earnings in the lowest decile imply that household income falls less when individual is in
state 𝑈 which in turn amounts to smaller tax reductions when changing from 𝐸 to 𝑈 .
On average, individuals in the lowest decile exhibit a tax reduction of 𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐,𝐸ℎ,1995− 𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐,𝑈ℎ,1995 =
11, 800− 9, 300 = 2, 500 and 𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐,𝐸ℎ,2005 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐,𝑈ℎ,2005 = 9, 000− 8, 300 = 700. As a result, lower
earnings leading to smaller tax reductions also contribute to lower PTRs in the bottom
decile.
Post-reform PTRs of the second lowest decile are both higher than in 1995 and higher
than PTRs of other 2005 earnings deciles. Individuals in the second lowest decile earned
a maximum of about 17,900 Euro (in prices of 2005) in 1995 and of about 15,300 Euro
in 2005. Elevated PTRs in that decile arise for technical reasons. The share of families
in the second lowest decile is higher compared to both 1995 and higher earnings deciles
in 2005. The share of families is 73% in 1995 and 78% in 2005. A larger share of families
in the decile increases both earnings-related unemployment benefits which is higher
for families with children and claims on social assistance. Additional child benefits
introduced in 2005 also contribute to raise families out-of-work benefits in comparison
to 1995. In 2005, the share of families peeks at the second lowest decile and then drops
to levels of 50% for higher earnings deciles. As a consequence, average out-of-work
benefits are higher in the second lowest decile inducing higher PTRs for a given level of
earnings. The slight decrease of post-reform PTRs of the following earnings deciles may
be explained by changed household structure, too. Neither unemployment benefits paid
in the first 12 months nor social assistance payments were changed by the reform 2005.
But in comparison to 1995, the share of families declines for all earnings deciles except
for the two lowest. Comparing earnings deciles suggests that out-of-work benefits are
lower in 2005 and PTRs accordingly because of the higher number of 1- and 2-person
households without children.
Empirical results on behavioral responses at the extensive margin can give an idea of
the optimal size of the PTR. The extensive elasticity measures the percentage number
of employed workers who decide to leave the labor force when the difference between
net income in-work and out-of-work decreases by 1 percent (Saez, 2002). The higher
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the extensive elasticities for a certain group, the lower is the optimal PTR for the group
(Brewer et al., 2008).17 The empirical literature finds that extensive elasticities are
higher for low-income, low-skilled individuals as they are eligible to substantial benefits
(Meghir/Phillipps, 2010). If PTRs exceeded the optimal value, the PTR decrease for
low-income individuals can be judged as a move in the right direction.
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Notes: PTR are median PTR of the respective earnings decile. Earnings deciles are based on earnings over one year and
three years, respectively. Dotted lines denote Hall’s (1994) bootstrap confidence intervals at 95%-level.
Over a 3-year period differences between the two periods appear more prominent as
can be taken from Figure 4. The distance to pre-reform PTRs tends to first diminish
and then grow with earnings. Section 6.3 analyzes if the abolition of earnings-related
unemployment assistance in 2005 can serve as the major explanation for the spread
between the periods. However, benefits are not equally important over earnings deciles.
As earnings increase benefits in 𝑈 become less important and the size of tax reductions
when changing from 𝐸 to 𝑈 grows. Income tax reforms by the red-green government
particularly reduce the tax burden of the rich (Corneo, 2005). A single with income
from earnings only, who is in the highest decile in both periods with earnings of 63,000
Euro in 1995 (72,000 in prices of 2005) and 72,000 Euro in 2005, has a stable out-of-work
gross benefit ratio resulting from 18,300
63,000
= 29% in 1995 and 21,000
72,000
= 29% in 2005. But
the in-work tax rate declines from 33,400
63,000
= 53% in 1995 to 35,300
72,000
= 49% in 2005 such
that the fraction of the PTR attributable to in-work taxes falls. The decrease in the
progressivity of the tax system induces the difference 𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐,𝐸ℎ,2005 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐,𝑈ℎ,2005 to decline. This
effect becomes even more prominent if accumulated over a 3-year period such that the
17Brewer at al. (2008) refer to the Ramsey principle of optimal taxation that commodities with rela-
tively more elastic demands should have relatively lower tax rates.
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decline of post-reform PTRs is more pronounced for the top of the earnings distribution.
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Source: Own calculations
Notes: PTR are median PTR of the respective earnings decile. Earnings deciles are based on earnings over one year and
three years, respectively. Dotted lines denote Hall’s (1994) bootstrap confidence intervals at 95%-level.
6.2 Distribution of participation tax rates over household types
The next two tables illustrate how long-term PTRs vary by gender and household type.
Table 15 and 16 display distributions of long-term PTRs sorted by size of PTRs. The
median (50th centile) is the middle number, such that half of individuals of the respec-
tive group face higher PTRs and half face lower.
Table 15 presents the distribution of PTRs for the pre-reform period. 25% of the male
singles face a PTR lower than 69% and 75% of the male singles face a PTR lower than
74%. This implies that half of the male singles have a PTR between 69% and 74%. For
half of the female singles PTRs between 67% and 73% arise. Hence, female singles face
lower PTRs than male singles which implicates higher work incentives for female singles.
Individuals living in couples are subject to the withdrawal of means-tested benefits when
household income exceeds the hypothetical claims. According to the lower level of state
support their PTRs should be lower than for singles. As Table 15 shows, individuals
living in couples without children have lower PTRs than singles. The median PTR lies
at 66% for men in childless couples and between 60% and 64% for women in childless
couples. The average PTR for a man in a one-earner couple is 64%. Immervoll et al.
(2009) find an average PTR for primary earners (mostly men) in one-earner couples
of 63% in 1998.18 Comparing PTR distributions for one-earner and two-earner house-
18The PTR of 63% would be presumably lower if computed over a 3-year period as we do, but Immervoll
et al. (2009) restrict their sample to primary earners working the entire year. On average, more
individuals may be eligible for unemployment benefits in their sample and may, as a consequence,
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holds reveals that individuals in two-earner households surprisingly face higher PTRs.
Benefit-withdrawal for individuals in two-earner households should lead to lower PTRs
than for one-earner households where benefit-withdrawal occurs only if other household
income sources than earnings are present. But one has to note that only 2% of men in
the sample and only 3% of women live in one-earner couples without children as shown
in Table 3. Due to the small number of observations, results for one-earner households
must be interpreted with caution. In contrast, 13% of men and 23% of women live in
two-earner couples without children.
PTRs for adults living in families with children lie between those of singles and childless
couples. Median PTRs are between 58% and 71%. On the one hand, unemployment
benefits and unemployment assistance are higher if children live in the household so
PTRs are higher for individuals with children. Furthermore, social assistance increases
with the number of household members. Apart from that, means-tested benefits will be
withdrawn largely if not completely when the spouse adds earnings to household income.
This will not occur for singles, which is why singles exhibit higher PTRs. Individuals
living in two-earner households with children face lower PTRs than those in one-earner
households. This is line with the expectations as outlined above. Means-tested benefits
will be withdrawn largely if not completely when the spouse adds earnings to house-
hold income which in turn leads to lower PTRs and stronger working incentives. Again,
women generally have lower levels of PTRs than men.
There is a consensus that extensive elasticities are higher for women than for men such
that optimal PTRs should be lower for women to increase working incentives.19 Indeed,
women in Germany face lower PTRs which is mainly due to their circumstances of living.
The distribution of PTRs by household type for the post-reform period is given in
Table 16. Again, singles have the highest PTRs with a median of 62%. Compared to
1995-1997 PTRs are lower for singles at all centile of the PTR distribution. Hence, work
incentives are strengthened across the entire group of singles.
Overall, the pre-reform order is preserved: Individuals living in couples with children
generally face the second highest PTR and most individuals in couples without children
have the lowest PTR. Additionally, PTRs are lower than in 1995-1997 for the majority
and, consequently, work incentives higher. Married men face lower PTRs in 2005-2007
which does not vary with household characteristics like presence of children or a working
exhibit higher PTRs.
19See Meghir/Philipps (2010) for a literature overview.
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Table 15: Centile of distribution of PTRs, 1995-1997
Household type 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th mean
Single, no children
Men 0.66 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.72
Women 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.77 0.70
Couple, no children
Men
Spouse not working 0.56 0.58 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.64
Spouse working 0.56 0.61 0.66 0.70 0.76 0.65
Women
Spouse not working 0.47 0.56 0.60 0.68 0.69 0.57
Spouse working 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.69 0.73 0.64
Couple with children
Men
Spouse not working 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.77 0.81 0.72
Spouse working 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.72 0.77 0.67
Women
Spouse not working 0.48 0.56 0.62 0.71 0.74 0.64
Spouse working 0.41 0.52 0.58 0.62 0.69 0.58
All 0.56 0.61 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.67
Source: Own calculations
Note: Each line displays the distribution of PTR for the respective subgroup.
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spouse. Typically, two-earner households are shaped by a high-income husband and a
side-earning wife such that the incentives of the husband whether or not to take up a
job is influenced sparsely by the presence of a second earner.
However, some exceptions remain. The distribution of PTRs for women living in families
with children substantially widens between 1995-1997 and 2005-2007. Low PTRs (10th
decile) are by about 10 percentage points smaller after the reforms for both women being
the single earner and living in two-earner households. At the other extreme, PTRs at
the 90th decile for women in two-earner families also grow by 15 percentage points.
Compared to the pre-reform period, more women live in single households or in couples
without children. The share of women living in families with children decreased which
causes the distribution of PTRs to be more dispersed. On the one hand, many women
in families are side earner. Claims for unemployment benefits are small if accumulated
at all and a change to unemployment reduces household income taxes negligibly. This
group faces small PTRs as described above. On the other hand, in 2005 more women
take up high-income jobs where they accumulate entitlements to unemployment benefits.
Their decision to change to state 𝑈 reduces household income taxes significantly. In sum,
this may lead to higher PTR at the other end of the distribution.
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Table 16: Centile of distribution of PTRs, 2005-2007
Household type 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th mean
Single, no children
Men 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.64
Women 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.71 0.64
Couple, no children
Men
Spouse not working 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.60 0.67 0.57
Spouse working 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.59
Women
Spouse not working 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.57
Spouse working 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.57
Couple with children
Men
Spouse not working 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.69 0.77 0.66
Spouse working 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.66 0.69 0.62
Women
Spouse not working 0.39 0.50 0.60 0.65 0.89 0.60
Spouse working 0.30 0.43 0.58 0.63 0.67 0.54
All 0.53 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.69 0.61
Source: Own calculations
Note: Each line displays the distribution of PTR for the respective subgroup.
6.3 Counterfactual participation tax rates
To analyze to what extent recent reforms contributed to improve work incentives, PTRs
are simulated for the counterfactual case that Hartz IV-reforms had not taken place.
The Hartz IV-reforms, i.e., the replacement of earnings-related unemployment assistance
with means-tested social assistance and enlarged earnings allowances for social assistance
recipients, is the part of the reforms most controversially discussed. Benefits are more
important for low- and middle income groups, whereas high-income groups are more
affected by taxes. Furthermore, work incentives at the extensive margin as captured
by PTRs are of greater importance for low-income individuals who face the decision
whether or not to work at all in the presence of a welfare state. As outlined above, em-
pirical literature finds evidence, that high-income individuals are more concerned about
their labor supply along the intensive margin. Therefore, the counterfactual analysis
concentrates on the Hartz IV-reforms and leaves tax reforms aside.
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In the counterfactual situation, unemployment assistance applies instead of social assis-
tance after the exhaustion of unemployment benefits as described in equation (8) and
spouse’s earnings are deducted from hypothetical claims on social assistance according
to the statutory rules of 1995 described in equation (11). PTRs are simulated for in-
comes and household characteristics of individuals in the sample in 2005. Most of the
post-reform PTR decrease can be traced to the abolition of unemployment assistance,
particularly for middle-income individuals as can be taken from Figure 5. The pattern
diverges for the margins of the earnings distribution. In the lowest decile, the major-
ity is not eligible for unemployment benefits and consequently not for unemployment
assistance. Small post-reform PTRs are predominantly explained by small changes in
household taxes from 𝐸 to 𝑈 stemming from low earnings in that decile. As a result,
the abolition of unemployment assistance is of no consequence for this group. For in-
dividuals in the 8th decile and above, abolition of unemployment assistance is less of
an explanation, because reductions of household income tax when out of work play a
greater role.
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Notes: PTR are median PTR of the respective earnings decile. Earnings deciles are based on earnings over one year and
three years, respectively. Dotted lines denote Hall’s (1994) bootstrap confidence intervals at 95%-level.
In the UK, growth in real earnings was the driving force behind the gradual strength-
ening of work incentives from the early 1980s to the late 1990s according to Adam et
al. (2006). But thereafter tax and benefit changes weakened work incentives in the UK.
The trend seems to be the opposite for Germany. Real gross wages have hardly risen
between the two periods considered here. Whereas changes in the benefit system have
contributed importantly to strengthen work incentives.
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7 Conclusion
This article has examined if work incentives have changed after the labor market re-
forms taking place in Germany between 1999 and 2005. Participation tax rates (PTR)
were computed for a pre-reform period 1995-1997 and a post-reform period 2005-2007.
Thereby, the time horizon of one year typically surveyed by studies on work incentives
is extended to three years. Standard economic theory suggests that individuals condi-
tion their participation decision rather on a longer time horizon than on a year only.
Moreover, the extension of the time horizon incorporates important changes in benefits
for long-term unemployed. The Hartz IV-reforms in 2005 replaced earnings-related un-
employment assistance being paid effectively until retirement with means-tested social
assistance. This leads to potentially harsh income drops for single earners if unemployed
for longer than a year.
Comparing the pre- and post-reform periods reveals that work incentives were strength-
ened through the changes in the tax-benefit system because PTRs have generally de-
creased. Both the traditional measure over a 1-year period (short-term) and the 3-year
(long-term) PTR show the improvement in work incentives. This study first provides
evidence that long-term work incentives actually improved more than short-term work
incentives. Particularly for singles, it is financially far less attractive to decide to be
unemployed than to work since the reforms. PTRs fell particularly for the bottom of
the distribution. This happens for two reasons: the growth of the low-income sector
increased the number of individuals in marginal employment who are not eligible for un-
employment benefits when out-of-work; the lowest decile is dominated by women married
to a husband earning their livelihood such that they are not eligible for benefits from
social assistance either and the reduction in household income taxes when the wife is
out-of-work is small. For the top of the earnings distribution, the reduction of household
income taxes when out of work outweighs out-of-work benefits in size.
As real wage growth in Germany was moderate between the two periods it contributes
only negligibly to improve work incentives if at all. A counterfactual analysis reveals
that the abolition of unemployment assistance in sequel of the Hartz IV-reforms pre-
dominantly explains increased work incentives of middle earnings classes. But this does
not hold for the margins of the earnings distribution. Individuals in the lowest decile lack
of eligibility for unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance. For high-income
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